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NOTE
EXCLUSION CONFUSION? A DEFENSE OF
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S SPECIFIC
EXCLUSION JURISPRUDENCE
Peter Curtis Magic*
Specific exclusion has become a controversial limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents, which is itself an essential and controver-
sial area of patent law. The doctrine of equivalents allows a
patentee to successfully claim infringement against devices that are
outside of the literal reach of the language used by the patentee in
her patent to describe what she claims as her invention. The Supreme
Court has prescribed some of the outer limits of the doctrine of
equivalents and articulated the underlying policy concerns that in-
form its analysis-noting that courts should balance protection of the
patentee's intellectual property with the public's reasonable expecta-
tions of the bounds of the patent-but has entrusted most of the
doctrine's development to the Federal Circuit. Critics argue that the
Federal Circuit has applied specific exclusion, which precludes the
doctrine of equivalents from reaching subject matter that is "spe-
cifically excluded" by the language used in the patent to describe
the invention, in a way that does not adhere to the Supreme Court's
guidance on the doctrine of equivalents. The critics assert that the
Federal Circuit has unduly narrowed the doctrine of equivalents by
applying specific exclusion too aggressively. This Note demon-
strates that the critics' extreme characterization of Federal Circuit
specific exclusion case law is unwarranted. The Federal Circuit has
consistently and conscientiously applied specific exclusion, and
their decisions conform to the Supreme Court's guidance on the
public notice function of patent claims. At the same time, the
Federal Circuit has protected patentees by not allowing specific ex-
clusion to reduce the doctrine of equivalents to another test for
literal infringement.
* J.D. candidate, May 2008. This Note would not have been possible without the guidance
of Emily Morris, assistant professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School. I wish to
thank Professor Morris for her generous time commitment in helping me strengthen every aspect of
this Note. I was also fortunate to have the superbly dedicated service of Leigh Wasserstrom as my
Note Editor. Finally, Ben Schweigert, Kate Drenning, Andrew Adams, and Silvia Vannini provided
invaluable commentary and encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of equivalents in patent law "is premised on language's in-
ability to capture the essence of innovation."' Because a patent's claims-
the part of the patent that defines what the patentee claims as her inven-
tion-consist of sentences and phrases, they suffer from the imprecision
inherent in language itself. The doctrine of equivalents states that the scope
of a patent is not necessarily limited to the literal meaning of the words in
the patent's claims, but may encompass inventions with elements insubstan-
tially different from those described in the patent. The scope of the doctrine
is limited by several analytical tools, including the all limitations rule,
I. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002).
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prosecution history estoppel, and the specific exclusion doctrine. This Note
focuses on the specific exclusion doctrine, which mandates that the doctrine
of equivalents cannot bring into a patent's scope "a structure that is specifi-
cally excluded from the scope of the claims."3 Specific exclusion has been
applied somewhat liberally by the Federal Circuit, sparking criticism that it
has narrowed the doctrine of equivalents too far.4 Nevertheless, as this Note
explains, the Federal Circuit has applied specific exclusion in a manner con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's view of the doctrine of equivalents
generally and has limited the doctrine of equivalents to a similar degree as
other limitations. Furthermore, contrary to the views of critics, specific ex-
clusion has not been applied by the Federal Circuit in a manner that vitiates5
the doctrine of equivalents altogether.
The two competing interests shaping the doctrine of equivalents are the
public-notice function of patent claims and protection of the patentee's
property rights. On one hand, the Supreme Court has stressed the impor-
tance of clarity in patent claim language so that the patentee "know[s] what
he owns, and the public ... know[s] what he does not."6 On the other hand,
the Court has recognized that "[i]f patents were always interpreted by their
literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished [because]
2. The all limitations rule, discussed infra, states that a determination of infringement by
equivalence is made by examining whether the accused device contains an equivalent of each claim
limitation in the patent, not by comparing inventions as a whole for equivalence. Freedman Seating
Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)).
Prosecution history estoppel, also discussed infra, prevents a patentee from employing the
doctrine of equivalents to bring within the scope of infringement analysis any material that was
disclaimed by amendment of the patent application during prosecution. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at
733-34.
3. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Dolly, the
patentee claimed a portable child's seat composed of a "stable rigid frame" formed from "side pan-
els," and the claim language recited seat panels and back panels as separate from the rigid frame. Id.
at 396. Evenflo made a competing child's seat composed of a "stable rigid frame assembled from
• .. seat and back panels." Id. at 400. The court held that the claim language specifically excluded
structures where the stable frame included seat and back panels. Id.
4. See, e.g., Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, "Vitiating" the Doctrine of Equiva-
lents: A New Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CR. B.J. 457 (2003) (arguing that the claim vitiation
doctrine has been used by the Federal Circuit either to narrow the doctrine of equivalents out of
existence or to make the doctrine of equivalents unworkable); Robert Pribish, Casenote, Freedman
Seating Co. and the Claim Vitiation Doctrine, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 379 (2006) (arguing that the
way in which the Federal Circuit has applied the claim vitiation doctrine, which includes the doc-
trine of specific exclusion, has destroyed the doctrine of equivalents). Federal Circuit Judge
Newman has also complained of allegedly improper use of specific exclusion. See Moore U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that it was improper for the court to apply specific exclusion and decide the issue of equivalence
on summary judgment when the parties did not dispute the evidence of function, way, and result or
the evidence of insubstantial difference).
5. The reader should note that the idea of "vitiating" the doctrine of equivalents should not
be confused with the doctrine of claim vitiation. The former simply means to gut, render meaning-
less, or to narrow out of existence the doctrine of equivalents as a theory of law altogether. The latter
has a much more narrow focus. Its concern is that there should be no finding of infringement if to
find infringement would require ignoring the meaning of a particular patent's claim limitation.
6. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 730-31.
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[u]nimportant and insubstantial substitutes ... could defeat the patent."7
These competing concerns pull in opposite directions on the doctrine of• 8
equivalents.
This Note contends that the Federal Circuit's specific exclusion juris-
prudence balances public notice and protection of the patentee in
accordance with Supreme Court precedent and has not improperly narrowed
the doctrine of equivalents. Part I of this Note analyzes the Supreme Court's
doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence, explaining that while the Court has
not addressed the specific exclusion doctrine directly, the trend has been to
narrow the doctrine of equivalents. Part II explores the role of specific ex-
clusion as a necessary limit on the doctrine of equivalents and argues that
the Federal Circuit has applied the specific exclusion limitation in a manner
consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of the doctrine of equiva-
lents. Specifically, this Note examines how the Supreme Court has
explained the proper role of other limitations on the doctrine of equivalents
and argues that the Federal Circuit's specific exclusion jurisprudence fits
within that framework. Part III refutes the criticism that the Federal Circuit
has applied specific exclusion so strongly that it has effectively vitiated the
doctrine of equivalents and shows not only that the Federal Circuit has con-
scientiously avoided narrowing the doctrine of equivalents out of existence,
but that it has reconciled specific exclusion with several measures of equiva-
lence.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREND OF NARROWING
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
This Part examines the creation of the doctrine of equivalents and the
Supreme Court's progressive narrowing of the doctrine through the applica-
tion of different analytical frameworks, such as the all limitations rule and
the "insubstantial differences" test. This Part also examines the Court's nar-
rowing of the doctrine of equivalents through progressively stronger
application of prosecution history estoppel, a limitation on the doctrine
stenining from an increased concern for the public notice function of patent
claims. Although specific exclusion has never been addressed by the Court,
the aforementioned frameworks serve as evidence that the Federal Circuit's
specific exclusion jurisprudence fits comfortably within the Supreme
Court's narrow conception of the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents originated in Winans v. Denmead9 in 1853.
The dispute in Winans centered on a patent for a new design of a rail car
used to carry coal. The patent claimed a cylindrical rail car container that
narrowed at its base to form the frustum of a cone, with the frustum ending
7. Id. at 731.
8. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) ("There can be
no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and
public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.").
9. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
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at a closed bottom.' ° The infringing design was an octagonal container that
became an inverted pyramid at its bottom."
The Court concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the de-
fendant's eight-sided rail car was equivalent to the plaintiff's patented
design. 2 The Court conceded that the plaintiff's patent explicitly claimed
"one form only."'3 Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the patent should cover not only a container of perfectly circular
design, but also designs of similar form that perform the same function,
such as a 100-sided approximation to a circular design.
4
The Court held that when a patentee writes a patent claim, "he is under-
stood to intend to claim, and does by law actually cover, not only the precise
forms he has described, but all other forms which embody his invention."'5
The Winans Court explained that the doctrine of equivalents was an essential
part of patent law 6 because "the property of inventors would be valueless, if
it were enough for the defendant to say" that his form was not exactly the
one that the plaintiff had claimed.17 Indeed, the Court found it "difficult to
perceive how any other rule could be applied ... to cases like this.""'
Nearly one hundred years after Winans, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the vitality of the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank & Manufacturing
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. and created a new test for applying the doc-
trine. 9 Graver Tank held that not to recognize any infringement beyond
literal infringement "would be to convert the protection of the patent grant
into a hollow and useless thing."' The Court further recognized that to do
10. Id. at 331.
11. Id. at 333.
12. Id. at 343-44. The Court held that the test was whether the infringer's railcar was "so
near to a true circle as substantially to embody the patentee's mode of operation, and thereby attain
the same kind of result as was reached by his invention." Id. at 344.
13. ld. at 342.
14. Id. at 333, 343-44.
15. Id. at 342.
16. As demonstrated infra, the Supreme Court has not wavered from this position.
17. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 342-43. The Court made this point clear a second time by
stating that "[t]he exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to
make substantial copies of it, varying its form or proportions." Id. at 343.
18. Id.
19. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). In Graver Tank the plaintiff held a patent on a certain electric weld-
ing composition or "flux" composed of a combination of alkaline earth metal and calcium fluoride.
Id. at 610. The accused compound was exactly like the patented compound except that instead of
using an alkaline earth metal it used manganese. Id. The Court agreed with the trial court's finding
that the accused compound was "substantially identical in operation and in result" to the patented
compound, id. at 611, and that "the changes which avoid[ed] literal infringement [were] colorable
only," id. at 612.
20. Id. at 607. Justice Jackson continued: "Such a limitation would leave room for-indeed
encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitu-
tions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside
the claim, and hence outside the reach of law." Id.
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otherwise "would be subordinating substance to form"'2' and would permit
one to "practice a fraud on a patent. '22 After endorsing the doctrine of
equivalents as a necessary component of patent law, Graver Tank articulated
the test for applying the doctrine commonly known as the "function-way-
result" test. The Court held that a plaintiff could evoke the doctrine of
equivalents if the defendant's device "performs substantially the same func-
tion in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."3
In addition to articulating the function-way-result test, the Court nar-
rowed the doctrine of equivalents by placing a separate constraint on the
equivalence analysis based on whether the change made by the defendant
was "so insubstantial" as to justify applying the doctrine. 4 The function-
way-result test and insubstantiality test do not overlap perfectly.2' A defen-
dant's device might be equivalent under the function-way-result test, yet still
26
be different from the patented device in a not "insubstantial" way.2 In that
circumstance, the doctrine of equivalents would apply.
7
Nearly fifty years after Graver Tank, the Supreme Court further nar-
rowed the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co.2s Plaintiff Hilton Davis held a patent for an "ultrafiltration"
process used to purify dyes. At issue was certain language in the patent
claims that required the use of an aqueous solution having "a pH from ap-
proximately 6.0 to 9.0."29 That language, according to the Court, was added
to the claim during patent prosecution to distinguish Hilton Davis's inven-
tion from an earlier patent that disclosed an ultrafiltration process that used
a solution with a pH above 9.0.' 0 Warner-Jenkinson's ultrafiltration process
21. Id.
22. Id. Not all the Justices agreed about the need for the doctrine of equivalents. Justice
Black strongly dissented, noting that "[wihat is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public."
Id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting). He criticized the doctrine of equivalents as "unjust to the public, as
well as an evasion of the law, [because it construes a claim] in a manner different from the plain
import of its terms." Id. Finally, Justice Black warned of anticompetitive effects resulting from the
doctrine of equivalents creating too much uncertainty as to the scope of patent claims. Id. at 617.
23. Id. at 608 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This test appears to
have roots at least as far back as Winans v. Denmead, where the Court stated that in order for a de-
fendant's device to be equivalent, it should "substantially ... embody the patentee's mode of
operation, and thereby attain the same kind of result... "56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344 (1853).
24. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610. The Court held that the changes in the accused compound
that helped it avoid literal infringement were colorable only (i.e. insubstantial). Id. at 612.
25. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law:
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 710 (1989) (explaining that the
function-way-result test would allow a finding of equivalence in certain instances where the test for
insubstantiality would not).
26. To my knowledge, no case actually addresses this circumstance. Likewise, in theory, the
reverse proposition may be true because the function-way-result test is arguably broader than the
insubstantiality test. Id.
27. Id.
28. 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) ("Petitioner... invites us to speak the death of th[e] doctrine [of
equivalents]. We decline that invitation.").




used a solution with a pH of 5.0.3" The district court sent the issue of equiva-
lence to the jury, which returned a verdict for the patentee. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed en banc, with several judges dis-
senting.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas "endeavor[ed] to clarify
the proper scope of the doctrine,"" and in doing so, he narrowed the doctrine
by creating a new test for equivalence.33 He recognized that the doctrine of
equivalents had become confusing and somewhat "unbounded"' 34 and that it
had the potential to conflict with the definitional and public-notice functions
of patent claims.3- To avoid such conflict, Justice Thomas explained, "the
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim,
not to the invention as a whole. 36 This standard has since become known as
the all elements rule.37 After articulating the standard, Justice Thomas
warned that courts should apply the doctrine in a sufficiently narrow manner
so as to avoid effectively eliminating an element entirely.
Next, Justice Thomas narrowed the doctrine of equivalents through his
application of prosecution history estoppel. 39 He explained that prosecution
history estoppel serves as a bar to applying the doctrine of equivalents to an
element of a claim when that element was added to the claim during prose-
40cution to avoid prior art. If the reason for the added claim language was not
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. at 21.
33. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (not-
ing that Warner-Jenkinson recognized that the all elements rule acts to constrain the doctrine of
equivalents).
34. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28.
35. Id. at 29.
•36. Id. This formulation was adopted from the dissent of Judge Nies in the Federal Circuit's
decision below. Id.
37. The all elements rule was later renamed by the Federal Circuit as the all limitations rule.
See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (Ethicon II), 149 F.3d 1309, 1317 n. (Fed.
Cir. 1998) ("We have said that '[i]n the All Elements rule, "element" is used in the sense of a limita-
tion of a claim,' . ... Thus, the All Elements rule might better be called the All Limitations rule."
(alteration in original)).
The all limitations rule and other tests for equivalence are questions of fact. Freedman Seating
Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("IA determination of] whether the
accused product or process contains each limitation ... either literally or by a substantial equivalent
... is a question of fact."). However, the Federal Circuit has often relied on language in Warner-
Jenkinson to allow it to render judgment on a question of equivalence (often by specific exclusion)
when no reasonable jury could possibly find equivalence. See Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofa-
mor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39
n.8).
38. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
39. The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel operates to prevent a patentee from employ-
ing the doctrine of equivalents to bring within the scope of infringement analysis any material that
was disclaimed by amendment of the application during prosecution. Jay I. Alexander, Cabining the
Doctrine of Equivalents in Festo: A Historical Perspective on the Relationship Between The Doc-
trines of Equivalents and Prosecution History Estoppel, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 603-04 (2002).
40. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 ("Where the reason for the change was not related to
avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude
November 2007]
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clear-for example, in Warner-Jenkinson it was unclear why the patentee
had amended the claim to include a lower pH limit of "approximately
6.0"-then, Justice Thomas explained, the patent holder must rebut4' the
presumption that prosecution history estoppel applies by proffering a reason
for the change.42
Finally, Justice Thomas stated that it would be the Federal Circuit's re-
sponsibility to refine the test for equivalence.4 1 Case-by-case analysis would
allow for such refinement, with the overall objective of promoting "cer-
tainty, consistency, and reviewability" in patent law.4 Tuming to the facts of
Warner-Jenkinson, Justice Thomas reversed and remanded to the Federal
Circuit to apply the newly articulated framework of equivalence and prose-
cution history estoppel.a Justice Thomas also hinted at the narrowness of
the scope of equivalence available to the patentee. He implied that Warner-
Jenkinson's 5.0 pH solution might not be considered equivalent to Hilton
Davis' claimed lower limit of 6.0 by stating that among the reasons for the
remand was "the preservation of some meaning for each element in a
claim.
, ,46
In 2002, five years after Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co.,47 and by
expanding the scope of prosecution history estoppel, the Court again nar-
rowed the doctrine of equivalents. By the time Festo reached the Court, the
Federal Circuit had found that case-by-case refinement of the rule of prose-
cution history estoppel had proven unworkable.4 8 The Court again
recognized the doctrine of equivalents and the uncertainty it created but
infringement by equivalents of that element."). Prior art is the body of works (publications, patents,
etc.) that existed in the relevant field prior to the applicant's filing date.
41. For example, the patent holder might have shown that they amended the claim not in
response to an examiner's rejection, but rather because they felt that their patent's specification more
clearly enabled the invention as limited by a lower limit of 6.0.
42. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33-34.
43. Id. at 40 ("[Wle leave such refinement to that court's sound judgment in this area of its
special expertise."). It is unclear whether Justice Thomas's statements in this regard indicate that a
specified numerical limit deserves little or no scope of equivalents.
44. Id. at 39 n.8.
45. Id. at41.
46. Id.
47. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
48. Festo, 535 U.S. at 730. Festo involved two patents for a magnetic rodless cylinder that
was used in a variety of industrial applications. Id. at 728 ("The device ... has been employed in
machinery as diverse as sewing equipment and the Thunder Mountain ride at Disney World."). The
district court described Festo's invention as "a magnetically coupled rodless cylinder [consisting of]
a hollow cylindrical tube which is connected to a pressure medium at either end, a piston containing
magnets ... and a driven member ... surrounding the tube and magnetically coupled to the piston
inside the tube." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 1993 WL 1510657, at
*1 (D. Mass. 1993).
The patent applications had been amended during prosecution to resolve some ambiguities in
the claims and because some of the claims did not conform to technical requirements of claim draft-
ing under the applicable patent statute. Festo, 535 U.S. at 736. The question facing the Supreme
Court was whether those reasons for amending the claims could give rise to an application of prose-
cution history estoppel. id. at 735.
[Vol. 106:347
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stated flatly that such uncertainty was "the price of ensuring the appropriate
incentives for innovation. 49
The Court addressed the appropriate analysis of prosecution history es-
toppel, explaining that Warner-Jenkinson left open the possibility that
estoppel could apply even if a claim was amended for reasons unrelated to
patentability. ° The Court stated that the "doctrine of equivalents is premised
on language's inability to capture the essence of innovation, but a prior ap-
plication [that is, a preamendment application] describing the precise
element at issue undercuts that premise."'" Therefore, when a patent owner
makes an amendment that relates to patentability, the presumption is that he
has disclaimed everything between the amended claim and the original1 2
claim. Finally, the Court recognized that a narrowed, postamendment claim
may still be analyzed for equivalents because the narrowed language was
not necessarily any more precise simply by virtue of having been nar-
rowed.53 Having explained the proper scope of prosecution history estoppel,
the Court remanded the case so that the Federal Circuit could determine the
extent to which the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption that the plaintiff
had surrendered all possible equivalents between the original claim and the
amended claim.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO SPECIFIC EXCLUSION
IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
First articulated in 1994 in Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 4 the
specific exclusion limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is based on the
notion that "the concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure that is spe-
cifically excluded from the scope of the claims."55 Specific exclusion
49. Id. at 732.
50. Id. at 735 (explaining that regardless of the reason for amendment, a court could still
consider whether prosecution history estoppel was required).
51. Id. at 734.
52. Id. at 740 (noting also that this presumption is rebuttable by the patent owner). This is a
broader application of prosecution history estoppel than in Warner-Jenkinson, where the court held
that prosecution history estoppel applies when a claim is amended to avoid the prior art. Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
53. Festo, 535 U.S. at 738. The Court also noted that some equivalents may not have been
foreseeable at the time the claim was written. Id. In those cases, the patentee would need to show
that at the time an amendment was made, it would have been unreasonable to expect one skilled in
the relevant art to have drafted the claim language so as to capture the unforeseen equivalent in its
literal scope. Id. at 740-41.
54. 16 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
55. Dolly, 16 F.3d at 400 (emphasis added). In Dolly, the patentee claimed a portable child's
seat composed of a "stable rigid frame" formed from "side panels," and the claim language recited
seat panels and back panels as separate from the rigid frame. Id. at 396. Evenflo made a competing
child's seat composed of a "stable rigid frame assembled from the seat and back panels." Id. at 400.
The court held that the claim language specifically excluded structures where the stable frame in-
cluded either seat or back panels. Id.
November 2007]
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developed as a corollary to the all limitations rule.56 The Federal Circuit has
explained that specific exclusion mirrors language in Warner-Jenkinson,57
stating that "the doctrine of equivalents cannot be employed in a manner
that wholly vitiates a claim limitation. '8 Under the all limitations rule, the
court may apply specific exclusion to narrow the permissible scope of
equivalence for a particular limitation.' 9 By potentially narrowing the scope
of equivalence for each claim limitation, specific exclusion ultimately nar-
rows the number of cases in which a court may find infringement via the
doctrine of equivalents.
Although the Supreme Court has provided guidance on how to frame a
doctrine of equivalents analysis, it also has explicitly given the Federal Cir-
cuit significant leeway to determine equivalence using the all limitations
rule.60 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court decided to "leave it to the
Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements [to the test
for equivalence] to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability.''6' By
giving the Federal Circuit discretion in formulating the test for equivalence,
the Supreme Court left the Federal Circuit constrained only by the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the doctrine of equivalents. The Court's jurispru-
dence instructs that the doctrine of equivalents serves a useful role in patent
law in helping to protect patentees by avoiding overly narrow claim con-
struction, but also requires courts to balance the practical needs of patentees
against the public notice function of patent claims. Balancing these two con-
cerns, the Federal Circuit has looked to the text of a patent's claims as well• • 62
as the patent's specification in making its specific exclusion determina-
tions.
This Part analyzes the Federal Circuit's specific exclusion jurisprudence
and details five ways in which the Federal Circuit has explained and applied
specific exclusion in a manner consistent with Supreme Court precedent on
56. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1346-47
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1996)). The all limitations rule, as mentioned in Part 1, supra, states that infringement by equiva-
lence may be found by examining whether the accused device contains an equivalent of each claim
limitation in the patent. Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29).
57. SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1346-47 (noting that specific exclusion is akin to the prohibition
against using the doctrine of equivalents in a way that would vitiate a claim limitation).
58. Id. at 1346.
59. As both a corollary and constraint on the all limitations rule, specific exclusion can be
thought of as one step in the overall analysis of the all limitations rule. When a particular claim
limitation is analyzed under the all limitations rule, the court could decide that the limitation specifi-
cally excludes certain alternatives. In that manner, specific exclusion doctrine can preclude a finding
of equivalence as to a particular claim limitation, and therefore, preclude a finding of equivalence
for an entire patent claim under the all limitations rule.
60. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
61. Id. at 39n.8.
62. A patent's specification is commonly understood to mean all of the written material
(including diagrams) contained in the patent before the claims, though the specification technically





the doctrine of equivalents. Section II.A maintains that the Federal Circuit
has adhered to the Supreme Court's articulation of the public notice function
of patent claims by more readily applying specific exclusion to claims that
are clear and detailed.64 Section ILB argues that the Federal Circuit has ap-
plied specific exclusion in a manner consistent with the requirement that an
equivalent cannot be substantially different from the language of a claim
limitation.65 Section II.C notes that case law often explains that specific ex-
clusion stems from the Supreme Court's requirement that courts not apply
the doctrine of equivalents in a way that would vitiate the language of a
claim. 66 Section II.D argues that specific exclusion accords with the
Supreme Court's prosecution history estoppel jurisprudence by giving ap-
propriate deference the public notice function of patent claims. Section II.E
63. The relevant Supreme Court precedent on the doctrine of equivalents and its limitations
is Winans, Graver Tank, Warner-Jenkinson, and Festo-the four cases discussed in Part I, supra.
64. See Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("A claim that
contains a detailed recitation of structure is properly accorded correspondingly limited recourse to
the doctrine of equivalents."); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that some claim language could be inherently narrow and therefore, "war-
rant[s] little, if any, range of equivalents"). The Federal Circuit's statements that accord detailed
claims a narrow scope of equivalence could incentivize patentees to draft vague claim limitations.
This would actually hinder the public notice function of patents, the very function that the court
seeks to protect in its specific exclusion analysis. Courts seem not to address this potential side
effect.
The Federal Circuit has explained that a clear or detailed claim makes it easier for the court
and the public to discern that which the patentee has excluded. See, e.g., Bicon, 441 F.3d at 955
("[B]y defining the claim in a way that clearly excluded certain subject matter, the patent implicitly
disclaimed the subject matter that was excluded .... (emphasis added) (quoting SciMed Life Sys.,
Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001))); Freedman
Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating, after discussing cases
involving clear structural limitations, that plaintiffs "chose to specifically limit the claims to slider-
crank mechanisms vis-i-vis the 'slidably mounted' moveable end limitation. Members of the public
were therefore justified in relying on this specific language in assessing the bounds of the claim");
see also Bicon, 441 F.3d at 955 ("A claim that contains a detailed recitation of structure is properly
accorded correspondingly limited recourse to the doctrine of equivalents." (emphasis added)).
65. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950) (framing the
question as "whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial court's
invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified"); Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 402 F.3d
1188, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (supporting its specific exclusion analysis by quoting language from a
previous case discussing insubstantial differences).
66. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. In SciMed, after reviewing case law on specific
exclusion, the Federal Circuit explained that "[tihe principle articulated in these cases is akin to the
familiar rule that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be employed in a manner that wholly vitiates a
claim limitation." 242 F.3d at 1346.
This rationale is inextricably related to the insubstantiality requirement insofar as the Federal
Circuit has indicated on several occasions that finding something that is substantially different from
the claim limitation to be equivalent would vitiate the language of the claim. Cases such as
Freedman Seating, Asyst, and Moore seem to indicate this. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1359-60
(explaining that finding defendant's device to be equivalent to plaintiff's patent claim limitations
would vitiate the claim limitations, and therefore, would not be an insubstantial difference); Asyst
Techs., 402 E3d at 1195 (supporting its specific exclusion analysis by quoting language from a
previous case discussing insubstantial differences); Moore, 229 F.3d at 1106 (explaining that finding
a minority to be equivalent to a majority would vitiate the claim limitation and be insubstantially
different from the claim limitation). Furthermore, Warner-Jenkinson stated that the various tests for
infringement were simply different linguistic frameworks to answer the same question. Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
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shows that the Federal Circuit has construed specific exclusion in a way that
leaves ample room for a finding of infringement against an after-arising
6' 68technology, a concern raised by the Supreme Court in Festo.
A. The Federal Circuit Has Applied Specific Exclusion with an
Eye Towards the Public Notice Function of Patent Claims
The Federal Circuit has aligned its specific exclusion jurisprudence with
Supreme Court precedent by explaining that the public notice function of
patent claims helps justify the specific exclusion doctrine. 69 As the Supreme
Court stated in Warner-Jenkinson and discussed at length in Festo, the doc-
trine of equivalents, if applied too broadly, could conflict with the public
70notice function of patent claims. Patent claims give the public, including
competitors, notice of what exactly the patent holder has claimed and the
bounds of the patentee's intellectual property.' Clarity in notice to the pub-
lic "is essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient investment
in innovation. 72 By constraining application of the doctrine of equivalents,
specific exclusion can operate to prevent a finding of infringement that
would be unexpected or unfair in light of the public notice given by the pat-
ent.
73
In Freedman Seating, the Federal Circuit imposed a bias against wide
claim scope for unambiguous claim language in order to maintain the bal-
ance between public notice and protection of patentees. The court explained
that unambiguous or detailed claim limitations may be entitled to a moreS 74
constricted scope of equivalents. The court stated that the public is entitled
to rely on specific language in the patent claims:
67. After-arising technologies are inventions that are developed after the patentee files her
patent application. After-arising technologies are usually unforeseeable. The classic example is a
patentee whose claims include a "means for fastening" at a time before Velcro was invented. The
later invention of Velcro would be an unforeseeable after-arising technology.
68. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002)
("There are some cases, however, where the amendment [by the patentee during prosecution history]
cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The equivalent may have been
unforeseeable at the time of the application .. .").
69. SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1347 ("The unavailability of the doctrine of equivalents could be
explained ... as the product of a clear and binding statement to the public that metallic structures
are excluded from the protection of the patent.").
70. Festo, 535 U.S. at 731 ("A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public
should know what he does not'); Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 ("There can be no denying that
the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice
functions of the statutory claiming requirement.").
71. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 731.
72. Id. at 730-31.
73. Caution against upsetting the reasonable expectations of the public based on the patent
claim language is pervasive in the Federal Circuit case law. See, e.g., Freedman Seating Co. v. Am.
Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that applying the doctrine of equiva-
lents would undermine the reasonable expectations of the public).
74. See id. at 1359.
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Given a choice of imposing the higher costs of careful prosecution on pat-
entees, or imposing the costs of foreclosed business activity on the public
at large, [the] court believes the costs are properly imposed on the group
best positioned to determine whether or not a particular invention warrants
investment at a higher level ... [-]the patentees. 5
In favoring public notice over the patentee, the Federal Circuit's doctrine
of equivalents analysis, and consequently, its specific exclusion analysis,
76tracked Warner-Jenkinson. Freedman Seating, the patentee, claimed a
stowable seat for use in public transportation, where the seat could collapse
into a vertical position for easy storage via a "slidably mounted" mechanism
beneath the seat." Freedman claimed that American Seating's competing
seat, which used a "rotatably mounted" stowing mechanism, infringed
Freedman's patent. The court, in finding no infringement, held that to find
equivalence between "slidably mounted" and "rotatably mounted" would
"unjustly undermine the reasonable expectations of the public" as to the
scope of Freedman Seating's claims. 8
B. The Federal Circuit Has Applied Specific Exclusion to Find
Nonequivalence where the Accused Device is Substantially
Different from the Language of a Claim Limitation
The Federal Circuit aligned specific exclusion with the Supreme Court's
"insubstantial difference" standard 9 by introducing in Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp. the principle that a claim limi-
tation and its opposite are not equivalent because they are necessarily
substantially different.8° In Ethicon, the plaintiff held a patent relating to a
surgical stapler. The defendant had developed a competing stapler, and the
issue of equivalence centered on the different lockout mechanisms used by
the competing staplers .8 The plaintiff's patent claimed a lockout mechanism
75. Sage Prods., inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997), quoted in
Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1362.
76. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) ("[Cllaims do
indeed serve both a definitional and a notice function, [and] we think the better rule is to place the
burden on the patent holder to establish the reason for an amendment required during patent prose-
cution.").
77. For diagrams of the seat, including the mechanism, see Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at
1352, 1354.
78. Id. at 1362.
79. The insubstantial difference test is merely one conceptual framework for determining
whether a particular claim limitation has a corresponding equivalent in the accused device. The
function-way-result test is another framewrrk. The Supreme Court explained in Warner-Jenkinson
that the linguistic framework chosen for analyzing equivalence is not pivotal. 520 U.S. at 40 (1997).
What matters is whether "the accused product or process contain[s] elements ... equivalent to each
claimed element of the patented invention[.]" Id.
80. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp. (Ethicon II), 149 E3d 1309,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 1998).




that was connected to certain longitudinal slots in the stapler. The lockout
mechanism in the defendant's stapler, however, was on the end of the stapler
opposite to the longitudinal slots.
3
The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of specific exclusion," explain-
ing that a patent specifically excludes subject matter that is inconsistent with
the language of its claims.85 The court focused on the fact that the defendant's
lockout mechanism, which was located near the rear of the stapler, was "op-
posite" and "not even close to" the longitudinal slots-the part to which the
lockout mechanism must be connected according to the patent claim lan-
16guage. Yet, the court also cautioned that it would not be correct to base a
finding of non-equivalence solely on the fact that the defendant's lockout
mechanism was not connected to the longitudinal slots.8 7 By focusing on the
great disparity between the defendant's product and the patent claim, Ethicon
introduced a notion that would be reinforced and articulated more clearly in
later cases: at a minimum, a patent claim can be said specifically to exclude
that which is its complete opposite.88 To find the opposite of the claim lan-
guage to be equivalent would violate the Graver Tank requirement that the
differences between equivalents be "insubstantial."' 9
82. Id. at 1316.
83. Id. at 1318-19.
84. Id. at 1317-19. The language in the plaintiff's patent relating to the position of the lock-
out mechanism was in the preamble of the claim, so the court noted that "the claim does not contain
a specific exclusion." Id. at 1319 (emphasis added). Technically, the court based its finding of non-
equivalence on the fact that the difference between the patent claim and the defendant's stapler were
not insubstantial. Later cases such as SciMed, however, recognized specific exclusion based on
language outside of the patent claims, for example, in the patent's written description. SciMed Life
Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he common
specification of SciMed's patents referred to [the structure of the accused device] as suffering from
[certain] disadvantages .... Having specifically identified, criticized, and disclaimed the [structure
of the accused device], the patentee cannot now invoke the doctrine of equivalents to 'embrace a
structure that was specifically excluded from the claims.'" (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Even-
flo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
85. Ethicon II, 149 F.3d., at 1317. The court also made clear that subject matter could be
outside of the literal scope of the claim limitation and yet not be inconsistent with the language of
the claim. Id.
86. Id. at 1318-19.
87. Id. at 1318. If the court were to allow such a finding without any minimum requirement
as to the degree of non-equivalence, infringement could be limited entirely to literal infringement.
88. This notion is gleaned from the fact that Ethicon II stated that subject matter is specifi-
cally excluded if including it within the scope of equivalence would be "inconsistent with the
language of the claim" and then went on to describe the "opposite" of the claim language as neces-
sarily a substantial difference. Id. at 1317-19.
89. See Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 402 F.3d 1188, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[Tlhe term
'mounted' can fairly be said to specifically exclude objects that are 'unmounted.' "); Moore U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[l~t would defy logic to con-
clude that a minority-the very antithesis of a majority-could be insubstantially different from a




C. The Federal Circuit Has Applied Specific Exclusion to Avoid
Vitiating the Language of Claim Limitations
A third way the Federal Circuit has viewed specific exclusion reflects
the Supreme Court's requirement in Warner-Jenkinson: a court may not ap-
ply the doctrine of equivalents so as to vitiate the language of a claim.90 In
SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., the
Federal Circuit reviewed its own case law on specific exclusion and ex-
plained the case law as "akin to the familiar rule that the doctrine of
equivalents cannot be employed in a manner that wholly vitiates a claim
limitation."9' The court found that the patentee had specifically criticized
and disclaimed "dual lumen configuration[s]" for catheters, and therefore
could not use the doctrine of equivalents to claim infringement against dual
lumen catheters.9' The court explained that "[t]he unavailability of the doc-
trine of equivalents could be explained either as the product of [claim
vitiation] or as ... a clear and binding statement to the public that [the sub-
ject matter at issue is] excluded from the protection of the patent."93
In addition to framing the specific exclusion analysis with respect to the
Supreme Court's prohibition against vitiation of the claim, the Federal Cir-
cuit has also linked the "non-vitiation" requirement to the Supreme Court's
"insubstantial difference" requirement. The Federal Circuit has often rea-
soned that where a defendant's device is substantially different from the
claimed invention, a finding of equivalence would vitiate the claim lan-
94guage.
D. The Federal Circuit Has Applied Specific Exclusion
in Accordance with the Supreme Court's Guidance
on Prosecution History Estoppel
In Freedman Seating, the Federal Circuit's treatment of specific exclu-
sion was not only consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of the
doctrine of equivalents generally but also with the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of prosecution history estoppel.95 This consistency is significant
because prosecution history estoppel, unlike specific exclusion, is a limita-
tion on the doctrine of equivalents that the Supreme Court has directly
90. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997). This pro-
hibition has since become known as the doctrine of claim vitiation.
91. 242 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). SciMed involved a patent for a dilation catheter
used in coronary angioplasty procedures. Id. at 1339.
92. SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1345.
93. Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (explaining that vitiation of the claim language would occur where the defendant's device was
substantially different from the patent claim); Asyst Techs., 402 F.3d at 1195; Moore, 229 F.3d at
1106-07.
95. Freedman Seating relied on language from Warner-Jenkinson dealing with public notice
and protection of the patentee in the context of prosecution history estoppel. See supra Section II.A.
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addressed. Warner-Jenkinson explained that courts should apply prosecution
history estoppel in accordance with "proper deference to the role of claims
in defining an invention and providing public notice" and that placing rea-
sonable limits on the doctrine of equivalents would help "insulate[] the
doctrine from any feared conflict with the Patent Act. 96 This language
shows that the Court analyzed prosecution history estoppel in light of over-
arching policies that constrain the doctrine of equivalents. The Court would
almost certainly analyze specific exclusion in light of the same overarching
policies. 97 Furthermore, specific exclusion can be viewed as operating con-
currently with prosecution history estoppel-thereby according deference to
the public notice function of patent claims-to the extent that material that
has been amended out of the claims is thereby specifically excluded from
the postamendment claim.
E. Specific Exclusion Has Not Made After-Arising
Technologies Immune to Infringement Liability
Finally, the Federal Circuit has construed specific exclusion in a way
that would not prevent a finding of infringement by equivalence by an after-
arising technology, a concern of the Supreme Court in Festo.98 This restraint in
applying specific exclusion is significant because a major purpose of the doc-
trine of equivalents is to give patent holders recourse against after-arising
technologies. 99 If the Federal Circuit were to apply specific exclusion too ag-
gressively, the doctrine of equivalents might not effectively perform this
important function. Rather than apply specific exclusion to such effect, the
Federal Circuit's specific exclusion jurisprudence has had "little or no appli-
cation to the case of later-developed technology."'0°
The Federal Circuit has attempted to avoid using specific exclusion to
foreclose infringement suits against after-arising technologies even when the
detailed language of the claim supports only a narrow scope of equiva-
lents."°' The Federal Circuit has explained this allowance in favor of the
patentee as part of a balance struck between the patentee "who had a clear
96. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997). The
"feared conflict" is that the doctrine of equivalents could be used to give the patent claims such a
large scope that they would reach subject matter that would not be patentable under the Patent Act.
Id.
97. The Court has given no indication that the overarching policies that guide the doctrine of
equivalents would not apply equally to both an analysis of specific exclusion and an analysis of
prosecution history estoppel.
98. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
99. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV.
105, 126 (2005) ("Indeed, covering equivalent technology not contemplated when the patent claims
were written is one of the major benefits of the doctrine of equivalents.").
100. Id. ("While the Federal Circuit has gone to significant lengths in recent years to cabin the
scope of the doctrine of equivalents in order to prevent abuse of the doctrine, those restrictions have
little or no application to the case of later-developed technology.").
101. See supra Section H.A.
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opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at
large," who are put on notice by the language of the patent claims."2 Admit-
tedly, striking the balance is a discretionary process, and the potential exists
for the Federal Circuit to apply specific exclusion too aggressively. Al-
though the Supreme Court has not provided detailed language regarding
how the Federal Circuit can or should avoid applying specific exclusion too
aggressively, at least one recent case demonstrates that the Federal Circuit is
still willing to affirm a finding of infringement against after-arising tech-
nologies, while rejecting the argument that the after-arising technology was
specifically excluded.
In Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc.,103 the Federal
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that because the plaintiff's patent
claim was worded narrowly, it could not reach the defendant's after-arising
product as an equivalent. The product at issue was a pharmaceutical com-
pound designed to induce and maintain general anesthesia. °" The doctrine
of equivalents dispute centered on whether edetate, a chemical required by
the language of the claims, could reach via equivalence the accused product,
which used calcium trisodium DTPA rather than edetate.'5 The Federal
Circuit noted that the defendant's product was an unforeseeable, after-
arising technology.'0 Therefore, the court reasoned, despite the specificity of
the language in the plaintiff's patent claim, the plaintiff could not possibly
have disavowed the defendant's product as an equivalent.0 7 Although the
court did not use the term "specific exclusion," the court's reasoning is eas-
ily read as an argument against applying specific exclusion because it found
equivalence despite specific, unambiguous claim language. 0 8
102. Planet Bingo, LLC v. Gametech Int'l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quot-
ing Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Although a
patentee logically cannot calculate how broad her patent claims should be to capture unforeseeable
technologies, she could logically assume that a broader claim would be nore likely to encompass
future technologies than a narrow claim.
103. 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
104. Abraxis, 467 F.3d at 1373.
105. Id. at 1379. Both chemicals fall within the group of compounds known as polyaminocar-
boxylates. Id. In this case, the chemicals were employed to prevent unsafe levels of bacteria from
forming in the anesthesia solution.
106. Id. at 1381-82.
107. Id.
108. It is doubtful the Federal Circuit would endorse a rule that a patentee can never specifically
exclude an unforeseeable, after-arising technology. In some cases, it seems likely that the scope of
equivalents for a patentee's claims could be extremely small. For example, Freedman Seating stated
that detailed, structural claims may only be entitled to a very narrow range of equivalents. Freedman
Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 E3d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Given the
court in Freedon Seating was willing to hold that the plaintiff's "slidably mounted" mechanism
excluded the defendant's "rotatably mounted" mechanism, id. at 1361, it is possible to envision the
court holding that a particular after-arising mechanism is also excluded.
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III. CONTRARY TO CRITICS' ARGUMENTS, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
SPECIFIC EXCLUSION JURISPRUDENCE HAS NOT
ENDANGERED THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Contrary to the view of critics, the Federal Circuit's treatment of specific
exclusion provides many assurances that it has not expanded to the point of
swallowing the doctrine of equivalents. In fact, the Federal Circuit has rec-
ognized that an overly strict application of the all limitations rule would
"swallow the doctrine of equivalents, reducing the application of the doc-
trine to nothing more than a repeated analysis of literal infringement."' 9 The
Federal Circuit's reasoning applies implicitly to specific exclusion doctrine
as well because specific exclusion operates on each claim limitation in a
doctrine of equivalents analysis under the all limitations rule. Some com-
mentators have argued that this risk-specific exclusion swallowing the
doctrine of equivalents-has in fact materialized under the Federal Circuit's
doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence." ° Critics assert that the Federal Cir-
cuit has applied claim vitiation doctrine and specific exclusion without
considering other measures of equivalence, such as insubstantial difference
or the function-way-result test."' Section III.A, however, demonstrates that
the Federal Circuit has generally refrained from applying specific exclusion
where it would effectively shrink the doctrine of equivalents to a test for
literal infringement." 2 Likewise, Section III.B shows that the Federal Circuit
has articulated a close connection between specific exclusion and other
measures of equivalence.' 
3
109. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (Ethicon I), 149 E3d 1309, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
110. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4 (arguing that the claim vitiation doctrine, which
includes the doctrine of specific exclusion, has been used by the Federal Circuit to either narrow the
doctrine of equivalents out of existence or to make the doctrine of equivalents unworkable); Pribish,
supra note 4 (arguing that the way the Federal Circuit has applied the doctrine of specific exclusion
has destroyed the doctrine of equivalents). Some have urged that the courts should do away with the
doctrine of equivalents altogether. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 612-18 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents improperly
expands the scope of the patent claims and violates the public notice function of the patent); Joshua
D. Samoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents lacks theoretical justifi-
cation, imposes social costs, and creates doctrinal complexity). This Note does not aim to make the
case for the doctrine of equivalents in general, but the Supreme Court has clearly disclaimed interest
in abolishing the doctrine. See supra Part I.
111. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 465-67,474-75.
112. It is also worth noting that much of the so-called shrinking of the doctrine of equivalents
is due to aggressive application of prosecution history estoppel, rather than specific exclusion. See,
e.g., Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (providing a
recent example in which the Federal Circuit has used prosecution history estoppel to restrain the
applicability of the doctrine of equivalents yet further); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 975 (2007) (finding that
in a survey of hundreds of doctrine of equivalence cases over the past eight years, prosecution his-
tory estoppel was the limitation asserted most frequently).
113. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (stating
that the tests are just different linguistic frameworks to answer the same question and that different
tests may be more suitable to different cases).
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A. The Federal Circuit's Specific Exclusion Jurisprudence Has Not Reduced
the Doctrine of Equivalents to a Test for Literal Infringement
Case law demonstrates the Federal Circuit's unwillingness to apply spe-
cific exclusion in a manner that would swallow the doctrine of equivalents.
Critics mistakenly point to cases such as Ethicon Endo-Surgery and Moore
as evidence that specific exclusion has been applied in a manner that re-
duces the doctrine of equivalents to a test for literal infringement."4 In
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, where the issue was whether the lockout mechanism
on the defendant's surgical stapler was equivalent to the lockout mechanism
as claimed in the plaintiff's patent, the court focused on "'connected to said
longitudinal slots'" as the key limitation."5 Critics assert that the court un-
duly focused on that limitation and argue that the result was an "all or
nothing" (i.e., literal infringement) rule for spatial arrangement limitations,
requiring a finding of noninfringement whenever the accused device does
not literally meet the claim limitation."
6
The court made clear, however, that it was not creating an all or nothing
rule, and that infringement by equivalence was something more than just
literal infringement. The court began by surveying the case law: "[The prior
cases] did not read the doctrine of equivalents out of existence when a claim
limitation is not expressly met by an accused device."' 7 Then, the court ex-
plained that "it would be insufficient to base a conclusion of non-
infringement by equivalents solely on the fact that the allegedly infringing
lockout is not connected to the longitudinal slots.""8 Finally, the court made
clear that it was the substantiality of the difference between the two staplers,
not merely that they were different, that made the doctrine of equivalents
inapplicable: "Because the rear of the stapler is opposite the longitudinal
slots, no reasonable jury could have found that the [defendant's] lockout was
substantially 'connected to said longitudinal slots.' 9
Critics point to Moore as another example of applying the doctrine of
equivalents as nothing more than a test for literal infringement. In Moore,
the Federal Circuit held that where the patent claimed an adhesive strip
that extended the "majority" of the length of the mailer to which it was
attached, the defendant's use of a mailer with an adhesive strip that ran
47.8% of the length of the mailer could not infringe by equivalence as a
114. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 465 (describing the rule applied in Ethicon IH as
"[e]very word in a claim is a limitation that must be met in an identical way").
115. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (Ethicon IT), 149 F.3d 1309, 1318-19
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (Ethicon 1), 900 F.
Supp. 172, 178 (S.D. Ohio 1995)).
116. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 467 ("Can an element that is literally not connected
to a separate element ever be substantially connected to that element? Under the all-or-nothing
[rule], it cannot.").
117. Ethicon HI, 149 F.3d at 1318.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
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matter of law."2 Critics argue that, after Moore, claim limitations that in-
volve numerical ranges cannot be infringed by equivalence. 2' They criticize
the doctrine of specific exclusion in such cases as requiring a finding that
"'a]n equivalent vitiates a claim limitation if the equivalent is excluded
from the literal scope of the claim language.' ,,22
Critics erroneously contend that this characterization of Moore is sup-
ported by Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc., ,
23
where the Federal Circuit held that "'the concept of equivalency cannot
embrace a structure that is specifically excluded from the scope of the
claims.' ,,124 That language in Athletic Alternatives does not support the
critics' position, however, because it does not imply that everything out-
side of the literal scope of the claim is by definition not equivalent. The
language does not imply that "scope" means "literal scope." The court in
Athletic Alternatives could not have meant "literal scope" when they said
"scope," as this would be contrary to the statement the court made at the
beginning of its doctrine of equivalents analysis: "Under the doctrine of
equivalents, an accused product that differs from the claim, and thus does
not literally infringe, nonetheless infringes if its difference from that claim
is insubstantial ....25
Critics further argue that Moore conflicts with Warner-Jenkinson be-
cause Moore allegedly eliminates the possibility that a pH level below 6.0
could be equivalent to a claim limitation that requires a pH range of 6.0 to
9.0, 1 6 but this criticism is misguided. The facts of Moore, which involved
specific claim language different from the language used in a disclosed but
unclaimed embodiment in the patent's specification, do not necessarily
require that limitations involving numerical ranges be constrained to their
literal scope. The court in Moore focused on the fact that the patent claim
120. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
121. Pribish, supra note 4, at 388-89.
122. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 473).
123. 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The technology at issue in Atffletic Alternatives was a
string system for tennis rackets. The patentee claimed a system where the strings as connected to the
perimeter of the racket were offset from the midline of the perimeter at an amount that "varie[d]
between" a predetermined maximum and minimum distance. Id. at 1582. The court interpreted this
to require that the strings of a given racket have at least three different offset distances. Id. The ac-
cused device used only had two offset values that it used for all the racket strings. Id. The court held
that the claim language specifically excluded any string system that used less than three offset dis-
tances. Id. at 1582-83.
124. Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1582 (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo. Cos.,
16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
125. Id. at 1581 (emphasis added); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.
(Ethicon I1), 149 E3d 1309, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Literal failure to meet a claim limitation does
not necessarily amount to 'specific exclusion.' ").
126. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 478 ("[The Federal Circuit's] adherence to nu-
merical limitations [in Moore] runs afoul of Warner-Jenkinson ... [in which] the Supreme Court
confirmed that the DOE could apply to compositions outside of a claimed numerical range ... ").
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limitation used the word "majority"'27 and that Moore had disclosed, but
declined to claim, an embodiment with more flexible language than ap-
peared in the claims.' 28 The presence of those factors in Moore caution
against reading Moore broadly as requiring no scope of equivalence for
numerical ranges. In light of those factors, the court made two arguments
as to why 47.8% was not equivalent to the claim limitation. First, the use
of the word "majority" gives notice to the public that the patentee is not
claiming anything that would be a "minority." The court applied the same
principle as in Ethicon Endo-Surgery: allowing a claim limitation to be
equivalent to its opposite would vitiate the limitation and would not be an
insubstantial difference. 29 Second, the court's decision was also influenced
by the fact that Moore had disclosed an embodiment in his written de-
scription130 that included an adhesive strip running "about 'half of the
length'" of the mailer, but conspicuously failed to use this language in the
actual claims. 3 ' Had this language appeared in Moore's patent claims, it
would have probably supported a finding that 47.8% was equivalent,132 but
the court stated that Moore could not "'enforce the unclaimed embodi-
ment.' ,133 The court also explained that different types of claim language
merit different ranges of equivalents, '34 and while the Court was unclear as
to exactly how large a scope of equivalence is afforded to a numerical
range in a particular case, the court's inclination to narrow the range in
this case was clearly influenced by the patentee's disclosed but unclaimed
embodiment. '
Moreover, two key factual differences distinguish Moore from Warner-
Jenkinson. First, the evidence showed that the patentee in Moore was
aware of, and disclosed in the written description, an alternative embodi-
ment that, if claimed, would have indicated his intent not to foreclose a
finding of equivalence. 36 Moore chose not to claim that embodiment and
instead claimed a more restrictive patent scope. In Warner-Jenkinson, by
contrast, the critical fact issue underlying the Court's decision to remand
127. See Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106-07 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
128. See id. at 1107.
129. See id. at 1106.
130. A written description is the part of the patent's specification that contains the patentee's
description of her invention. In the written description the patentee usually discloses several ver-
sions, or embodiments, of her invention.
131. Id. at 1107.
132. Id. (describing the claimed and unclaimed embodiments respectively as "one in which
the first and second longitudinal strips extend a majority of the length of the longitudinal marginal
portions, and one in which they do not").
133. Id. (quoting YBM Magnex, Inc. V. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 145 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
134. Id. at 1106.




the case was that "the record seem[ed] not to reveal the reason for includ-
ing the lower pH limit of 6.0.",137 The result is that in Moore, the court
supported its finding of nonequivalence by noting the affirmative choice
made by the patentee, whereas in Warner-Jenkinson the lower court had
not yet made a finding as to the reason for the patentee's amendment to
the claim.
Second, in Warner-Jenkinson, the relevant claim limitation read: "a pH
from approximately 6.0 to 9.0.", 3' The Court might not have expressly
ruled out the possibility of the equivalence of a pH below 6.0 due to the
word "approximately." Because the Court did not address this issue, how-
ever, any supposition would be purely speculative. Nevertheless, the way
in which Moore clung to the word "majority" indicates that the result in





Beyond Ethicon Endo-Surgery and Moore, the Federal Circuit has
shown in other cases a willingness not to apply specific exclusion too ag-
gressively. In Riles v. Shell Exploration and Production Co.,' 40 over Judge
Michel's dissent, the court refused to apply specific exclusion where the
claim limitation described an oil-drilling platform support mechanism in-
volving "metal-to-metal bearing contact" between different parts of the
structure. 4' The accused device had placed a layer of wood four inches
thick between the two metal ends. 42 The court found that the difference
was insubstantial, 43 refusing to follow Judge Michel's more literal view
that the word "contact" specifically excluded devices that did not have
direct contact of metal to metal.' 44
137. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). The Supreme
Court instructed that if no reason had been offered by the patentee, then the Federal Circuit should
presume that the reason for amendment was related to patentability, thereby triggering prosecution
history estoppel. Id.
138. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
139. As further evidence that the word "approximately" matters, on remand from the Supreme
Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson, the Federal Circuit stated: "[If the district court finds that
prosecution history estoppel does not apply, then the] jury's finding that the accused process with a
pH of 5.0 is equivalent to the claimed process with a lower limit of approximately 6.0 does not...
vitiate the claim limitation." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
140. 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
141. Riles, 298 F.3d at 1309.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1310 ("[I]n the context of the metal jacket leg (over seven hundred feet in length), a
four-inch layer of wood. . . is an insubstantial addition." (emphases added)).
144. Id. at 1314 (Michel, J., dissenting).
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B. The Federal Circuit Has Not Applied Specific Exclusion in a Manner
that Ignores Other Tests for Equivalence
The second main criticism of the Federal Circuit's claim vitiation and
specific exclusion jurisprudence is that the Court has applied both the
claim vitiation doctrine and specific exclusion without considering other
measures of equivalence, such as insubstantial difference or the function-
way-result test. 45 Critics argue that by ignoring the other measures of
equivalence, the Federal Circuit has denied a finding of equivalence where
the other measures would have allowed it. 46 The critics' arguments fail for
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court stated in Warner-Jenkinson that dif-
ferent tests for equivalence may be suitable for different cases, 47 and the
Federal Circuit has accordingly employed several tests. 48 Second, the Fed-
eral Circuit has in fact often recognized a relationship between specific
exclusion and other measures of equivalence.
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court gave the Federal Circuit
discretion in deciding what associations to draw between the different
tests for equivalence, addressing "the debate regarding the linguistic
framework under which 'equivalence' is determined."'' 49 The Court stated
in unambiguous terms: "In our view, the particular linguistic framework
used is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential
inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention?"'5 ° By this
language, the Court gave the Federal Circuit substantial freedom to apply
whichever linguistic framework it felt was best suited for an equivalence
determination in a particular case. Exercising this discretion, the Federal
Circuit has frequently chosen to apply the all limitations rule.'' Within that
rule, the court has frequently undertaken a specific exclusion and claim
vitiation analysis. Although the court is free to tie as many linguistic
145. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1119 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should not decide the issue of equivalence as
a matter of law where the evidence of function, way, and result, along with insubstantial difference,
were not disputed by the parties); Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 466 (arguing that the court in
Ethicon IH failed to consider the insubstantial differences test or the function-way-result test).
146. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 4, at 475 (using the holding in Moore as an example).
147. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
148. See Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (U.S.A.) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1380-82
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying the function-way-result test); Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co.,
420 E3d 1350, 1358-60 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying the all limitations rule); Moore, 229 F.3d at
1106-07 (applying the insubstantial differences test).
149. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39.
150. Id. at 40. The Court went on to say that "[d]ifferent linguistic frameworks may be more
suitable to different cases." Id.
151. See, e.g., Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (applying the all limitations rule); Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (applying the all limitations rule); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.
(Ethicon I1), 149 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (applying the all limitations rule).
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frameworks-insubstantial difference, function-way-result-to this analysis
as it would like, it need not do so in every case.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has in fact tied different frameworks
together in several cases, indicating that specific exclusion and claim vitia-
tion are related to the "insubstantial difference" test of equivalence. 5 2 In
Moore, the court noted that finding 47.8% as equivalent to a "majority"
would not only vitiate the claim limitation, it would be a substantial dif-
ference from the claim limitation. 53 Although Moore cast its argument in
vitiation terms, a later Federal Circuit case, SciMed, discussed Moore as
an example of specific exclusion. 5 4 Finally, Freedman Seating connected
specific exclusion to the "insubstantial difference" doctrine, holding that
the claim limitation "slidably mounted" specifically excluded the defen-
dant's "rotatably mounted" design, and that the two could not be
equivalent because the difference was "clear" and "substantial."5 5 These
cases show that the Federal Circuit perceives a close connection between




Specific exclusion has become a controversial limitation on the doc-
trine of equivalents, which is itself an essential and controversial area of
patent law. The Supreme Court has prescribed some of the outer limits of
the doctrine of equivalents and articulated the underlying policy concerns
152. See Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1359-60 (explaining that finding defendant's device
to be equivalent to plaintiff's patent claim limitations would vitiate the claim limitations, and there-
fore, would be an insubstantial difference); Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 402 F.3d 1188, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (supporting its specific exclusion analysis by quoting language from a previous case
discussing insubstantial differences); Moore, 229 F.3d at 1106 (explaining that finding a minority to be
equivalent to a majority would vitiate the claim limitation and be substantially different from the claim
limitation); see also Allison & Lemley, supra note 112, at 974-75 ("Of the 413 [doctrine of equivalents
cases from the past eight years] in our dataset, 126 used more than one test [for equivalence].").
153. Moore, 229F.3dat 1106.
154. SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2001). The connection between specific exclusion and vitiation drawn in SciMed supports the notion
that when something is specifically excluded from a claim, to find that same thing to be equivalent
to the claim would vitiate the claim language.
155. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1361.
156. The exact contours of the connection are not clear. The Federal Circuit seems to have
indicated that whatever is specifically excluded would also constitute a substantial difference from
the claim limitation because it has expressed the view that equivalence and insubstantiality are one
and the same. See id. at 1360 ("[W]e concluded that no reasonable juror could find equivalence, i.e.,
an insubstantial difference."). There is no evidence to support the opposite proposition-that any
substantial difference must be specifically excluded.
The Federal Circuit has also linked the function-way-result test to claim vitiation. On remand
from the Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson, the Federal Circuit stated that there was
evidence to support a finding that "performing ultrafiltration at a pH of 5.0 ... perform[s] substan-
tially the same function in substantially the same way to reach substantially the same result as
performing ultrafiltration at 6.0.... The jury's finding that the accused process.., is equivalent...
does not therefore vitiate the claim limitation." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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that inform its analysis but has entrusted most of the doctrine's develop-
ment to the Federal Circuit. Critics argue that the Federal Circuit has
applied specific exclusion in a way that has not adhered to the Supreme
Court's guidance on the doctrine of equivalents. This Note demonstrates
that the Federal Circuit has consistently and conscientiously applied spe-
cific exclusion in a manner that conforms to the Supreme Court's guidance
on the public notice function of patent claims. At the same time, the Fed-
eral Circuit has protected patentees by not allowing specific exclusion to
narrow the doctrine of the equivalents to the point of being just another
test for literal infringement. The Federal Circuit's specific exclusion juris-
prudence has balanced these competing interests well within the broad
discretion granted by the Supreme Court.
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